Refusal of Refugees

Illinois Gov. Bruce Rauner said Monday he will "temporarily suspend" efforts to admit Syrian refugees, while also talking about the state and country's "shared history of providing safe haven for those displaced by conflict." "We must find a way to balance our tradition as a state welcoming of refugees while ensuring the safety and security of our citizens," he said. Massachusetts Gov. Charlie Baker, who previously said he was open to helping resettle Syrians, now says he is "not Interested." "I would say no as of right now," he on Monday. "No, I'm not interested in accepting refugees from Syria." North Carolina Gov. Pat McCrory announced Monday that he is asking the govemment to stop sending Syrian refugees to his state. He said 59 Syrian refugees had been resettled there already and the state received too little information about them. Texas Gov. Greg Abbott sent President Barack Obama a letter telling him his state would not welcome Syrians and urging him to halt plans to admit more of them into the U .S. Abbott argued that any Syrian might be connected to terrorism. Idaho Gov. Butch Otter said in a statement that it makes no sense "to allow people into our country who have the avowed desire to harm our communities, our institutions and our people." He said he would "use any legal means available" to block Syrian refugee resettlement in the state. Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker joined the chorus on Monday afternoon. "There may be those who will try to take advantage Of the generosity Of our country and the ability to move freely within our borders through this federal resettlement program, and we must ensure we are doing all we can to safeguard the security of Americans," he said in a statement. Arizona Gov. Doug Ducey took the most extreme approach — he announced he will oppose the resettlement of all refugees in his state, not just those from Syria. Others were more moderate. Nevada Gov. Brian Sandoval (R) said Monday he wants the White House to review how it screens refugees, but did not say he would try to block Syrians from his state. Some governors, including Connecticut Gov. Dan Malloy Colorado Gov. John Hickenlooper (D) and Washington Gov. went in the opposite direction, affirming Monday they will welcome Syrian refugees. "Our first priority remains the safety of our residents," Hickenlooper said in a statement. "We will work with the federal government and Homeland Security to ensure the national verification processes for refugees are as stringent as possible. We can protect our security and provide a place where the world's most vulnerable can rebuild their lives. " Kentucky Gov. Steve Beshear (D) also said his state would continue to admit Syrian refugees. But he will soon be replaced by incoming Gov. Matt Bevin (R), who them. Obama said Monday he remained committed to taking in Syrian refugees, but they must go through rigorous screening.

Works Cited
Foley, Elise. "Here's a Running Tally of the Governors Who Want to Reject Syrian Refugees." Republican Governors Syrian Refugees. Huffington Post, 16 Nov. 2015. Web. 17 Nov. 2015.


Response:
The terrorist attacks continue to linger in people's minds so much that they have started to take measures into their own hands. It is easy to see why people, namely the governors, would want to reject the refugees after the Paris attacks, yet the situation for the refugees becomes more desperate, more like a crisis for them. These governors, with their people in mind, are wise to keep the refugees out, even if it means that refugees will have to find refuge elsewhere. Hopefully, the US will support the refugees in another way.

Britain At Crossroads

David Cameron is right to make it clear: without a deal, Britain will leave the EU

"No longer the unwilling component of an unprecedented attempt at political unification, but
independent, standing or falling on our own merits"
That is Why today the prime Minister is so right to flash some steel — to unsheathe a section of the blade that might soon be used to cut the rope and set Britain free. Free to make our own laws and our own trade deals; to have impact in the world commensurate with our own abilities, no longer believing that we can somehow puff ourselves up and "punch above our weight" by contriving to call the shots among 28 nations in the smoke-free corridors of Brussels. No longer to sacrifice parliamentary democracy for diplomatic "influence"; no longer the subset of a superstate; no longer the unwilling component of a unique and unprecedented attempt at political unification, but independent, standing or falling on our own merits. David Cameron is making it clear, in his long-awaited speech, that if he doesn't get a satisfactory result in those negotiations, then he could lead the Out campaign; and in that great release of pent-up Eurosceptic energy there can be little doubt that he would be victorious. And then what? Well, there would unquestionably be a scratchy period. There would be anxiety in Washington, where they like the convenience of having their closest ally round the table in the El J. There would be nervousness among some of the big international investors in the UK who would not want to be shut out from the Single Market — and those fears would have to be allayed. In many EU countries — and this is a point that weighs with me — there would be real shock and dismay from those who think that Britain has much to contribute, and who know in their hearts that without active British engagement, the history of Europe in the last 100 years would have been (to put it mildly) a whole lot worse. But is that enough in 2015, 70 years after the end of the last war? Must British influence be expressed through this supranational body, with all its anti-democratic practices? If we are to be successful in this negotiation — and stay in a reformed EU — then our friends and partners must understand that we are serious in our aims. The Prime Minister is rightly calling for reform that will give this country back control of its borders; that will stop the one-way ratchet towards ever closer union; that will curtail the profusion of regulation; that will stop the eurozone countries from bullying those EU countries who do not use the euro and probably never will.We need somehow to persuade our friends of what their own electorates are telling them — that it is better and more democratic to ensure that as much decision making as possible is handed back to national parliaments, and we need the negotiations to give effect to that ambition as well. It can work. I am sure that David Cameron can get what he wants by the end of next year. And if our friends are so irrational as to say no, and we vote accordingly to come out, is that really the end of the
story? Look at all previous "no" votes. The Danes voted no. The French, the Irish, even the Dutch they have all at one stage or other put two fingers up to the treaties. They are still members. The other countries just had to make the necessary adjustments.
"In the coming campaign we will hear torrents of drivel from all the people who traditionally warn about us about leaving'

Indeed, you could argue that the only language our friends understand is an initial no — and that is the only thing that will really bring them to the table, make them focus on the need for reform. Britain's relationship with Europe has already changed, in the sense that we are not members of the dominant political project — the single currency, with all its further erosions Of democracy. We are already members of a very different club from France and Germany. But there are other members of that club; others who are not in the euro but who want free trade. It would be no bad thing to lead that group, to formalize what is already a semi-divorce. One thing is sure: in the coming campaign we will hear absolute torrents of drivel from all the people who traditionally warn about us not being included in some European project — big business, the CBI, the Europhiles in Parliament. Remember: they were wrong about the ERM, they were wrong about the euro and they are already exaggerating the downsides of leaving.
We want to stay in, but not at any price. David Cameron is right to make that clear.
Excerpted from David Cameron is right ro make ir clear' withou' a deal. Brilain will leave the EU - Telegraph


Works Cited:
Johnson, Boris. "David Cameron Is Right to Make It Clear: Without a Deal, Britain Will Leave the EU." The Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group, 9 Nov. 2015. Web. 09 Nov. 2015.

Response:
The European Union (EU) is going to have to make compromises and formulate a better deal for Britain, because at this point, Britain doesn't seem to be messing around. From initial remarks, it seemed that Britain may have been bluffing or just trying to squeeze a better deal out from the EU, but now Britain is actually considering of opting out of the EU. This single decision would be a game changer pertaining to international relations as Britain is a huge trading engine for the EU. Also the US, being one of Britain's biggest allies, will now have to encounter a different face of the EU without Britain at their side. Britain also being an economic world power, will have to decide how this decision will affect independent businesses and internal trade, which in turn effects exports and imports from other countries. Britain is on the brink of their heavy decision, and whichever side wins, will absolutely affect the country and international relations.
In response to bias, it wasn't too noticeable as both sides were clearly outlined and the author wasn't leaning to one side or the other.

China's New Island

The U.S. Must Accommodate China's Power in the Island Dispute -- Or Be Willing to Pay a High Price | Hugh White

SYDNEY -- There are two ways to see the U.S. Navy's freedom of navigation operation in the South China Sea. We can see it is as a modest legal maneuver, designed to assert Washington's interpretation of some rather arcane and contested points of international maritime law. Or we can see this week's operation as a big strategic move in the new power politics of Asia.

Seen this second way, it was designed to reassert America's naval preponderance in the western Pacific in the face of Beijing's increasingly bold and forthright challenge, and thereby to defend the traditional U.S.-led regional order from China's drive to displace American leadership and create a new Sino-centric strategic system in Asia.

Washington hopes that the rest of us will see it as both of these things -- a routine legal maneuver and a forthright assertion of strategic resolve. It is likely to be disappointed. This week's events may simply reinforce how badly Washington misunderstands the challenge it faces in Asia.

The U.S. is not defending any general right of freedom of navigation through the South China Sea, because nothing China is doing on or around the islands it occupies there can credibly be construed as challenging that general right.

Look at the legal aspect first. Washington is clearly trying to present the operation in this light, as a routine assertion of U.S. interpretation of maritime law. But it is not saying exactly what legal position this operation is supposed to assert.

One thing is for certain: it is not defending any general right of freedom of navigation through the South China Sea, because nothing China is doing on or around the islands it occupies there can credibly be construed as challenging that general right. Washington's frequent oblique suggestions to the contrary are frankly misleading.

There are three genuine legal issues the U.S. may have been trying to pursue. One is the right of "innocent passage" through acknowledged territorial sea, which America asserts and China perhaps disputes. Another is the legitimacy of claiming a 12 nautical mile territorial sea zone based on a feature which is submerged at high tide, which America denies and China may be trying to assert. Third, America may be contesting China's claim to the feature itself, and hence to any territorial sea around it.

If China retaliates in any substantive way, for example by enhancing its military forces or posture around the Spratlys, then Washington faces a very tough choice indeed.

Of these it seems the most likely rationale of this week's operation is the second option. A State Department spokesman described the transit as occurring in international waters, which rules out the first option, and the third would imply that America had abandoned its long-held refusal to take any view of the merits of the various competing claims throughout the South China Sea.

In reality, however, it hardly matters, because it is perfectly obvious, despite Washington's claims, that the legal issue is a pretext for an operation whose real purpose was strategic. The Obama administration is trying to use the legal device of a freedom of navigation operation to show its resolve in the escalating power-political rivalry with China over the future leadership of Asia.

How well that works depends on how China responds. It will be a clear success if China backs off from its assertive behavior, stops developing its island bases and generally returns to quiet acceptance of U.S. primacy in Asia. But the chances of this are vanishingly small.

Washington still expects Beijing to back off at the first faint sign of U.S. resolve. It doesn't grasp that Xi Jinping may be at least as determined to change the Asian order as Barack Obama is to preserve it, and that he may believe he holds the better hand.

It is far more likely that China will either ignore the U.S. transits, or retaliate. If China just issues angry statements and then carries on as before, America's big move looks weak and ineffective. If China retaliates in any substantive way, for example by enhancing its military forces or posture around the Spratlys, then Washington faces a very tough choice indeed.

If it backs off meekly in the face of Chinese escalation, the administration would look even weaker than it does now, and suffer grave damage to its credibility both at home, in Asia and globally. But a robust response would risk further countermoves by China, and further escalation towards open conflict. That would entail huge economic costs and little chance of quick and easy victory for America. No U.S. president could lightly take this path.

It is hard to see how getting itself in this position looks smart for Washington. The administration seems to be assuming that a low-risk, low-cost routine legal maneuver like a freedom of navigation operation could serve as a decisive move in a high-risk, high-stakes strategic competition. That suggests that America still does not understand the nature of the contest it is now waging with China.

Washington still expects Beijing to back off at the first faint sign of U.S. resolve. It doesn't grasp that Xi Jinping may be at least as determined to change the Asian order as Barack Obama is to preserve it, and that he may believe he holds the better hand. Everything Xi has done over the past few years suggests very plainly that he does indeed believe this. And everything Washington had done since the "pivot" suggests it doesn't understand its adversary in Asia.

America therefore needs to stop pretending to itself that it can do this on the cheap.

China today is a very powerful and ambitious country, led by a man who really is determined to build new model of great power relations in Asia to replace the regional order based on U.S. primacy. There are no low-risk, low-cost ways to respond to this challenge. The more Washington tries to respond in such ways, as it has done this week, the more plainly it signals that America lacks the resolve to take the much tougher measures needed to preserve a strong role for itself in Asia.

America can only constrain China's growing power in Asia if it is unambiguously willing to impose big costs and risks on Beijing, and that can only be done by accepting equally onerous costs and risks itself. America therefore needs to stop pretending to itself that it can do this on the cheap.

It also needs to consider what kind of role it really needs to play in Asia, and what it is willing to pay to play that role. It may well be that maintaining its traditional primacy in the face of China's power will cost America more than it is worth. If so, Washington needs to conceive and negotiate a new role in Asia which preserves the most important U.S. interests at a cost America is willing to pay over the long term. And that would mean accommodating China's ambitions to some degree.


Works Cited:

White, Hugh. "The U.S. Must Accommodate China's Power in the Island Dispute -- Or Be Willing to Pay a High Price." The U.S. Must Accommodate China's Power in the Island Dispute -- Or Be Willing to Pay a High Price. Huffington Post, 27 Oct. 15. Web. 2 Nov. 15.


Response:

The US is playing with fire, as their naval vessel encroaches on disputed Chinese territory. China, being one of the world's superpowers, is making great strides in Asia, as it is trying to widen its sphere of influence. The US has been playing this game since its very existence, but now they are being contested in Asia with China as their adversary. The US, according to this article is testing the legitimacy of the disputed island and is basing its next decision on China's reactions. This is an interesting game that if played right, can be used to the advantage of either side. The US obviously holds the most cards, but growing China isn't one to be known to back down easily. Especially now that many of its former traditional policies and laws are changing and are working towards a more progressive China. The US has some strategy in mind, but they are wrestling with another world giant.
The bias in this article was almost unnoticeable. It seemed to be well written from an impartial point of view. If anything, there may have been some bias towards the Chinese who seemed to be a little bit more favored in the land dispute.